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Introduction 
 One of the most important development issues facing the international community for 
several decades has been the low levels of public expenditures in infrastructure and social 
services in developing countries.
1
 Low levels of public spending in those areas may have been 
responsible for placing many of these countries in a poverty trap. Breaking out of this trap 
requires, among others, a combination of international aid in the form of technical assistance 
with low cost loans and increased sustained tax effort by the developing countries themselves.
2
 
However, international aid, especially when it is accompanied with debt forgiveness, can interact 
with domestic tax effort in some perverse ways, which can compromise the sustainability of 
these fundamental development goals. And even though, there has been considerable interest in 
the economic literature on the separate topics of tax effort in developing countries,
3
 and 
international assistance and debt forgiveness,
4
 the interaction between these two issues has not 
yet been thoroughly explored in the literature. 
The issue of debt forgiveness has generated much debate in both the academic and policy 
literatures, and rightly so. Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative started in 
1996 and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) started in late 2005, financial assistance 
to some developing countries amounted to $117 billion in nominal terms over the last decade.
5
 In 
2007, this level of assistance represented about one half of the GDP of the heavily indebted 
countries put together. In particular, at the June 1999 Cologne summit, the G-7 decided to write 
off approximately $100 billion of developing countries sovereign debt. The decision to write-off 
these debts as opposed to providing a temporary solution through debt rescheduling was seen as 
necessary to improve the supply of resources in these countries and to enhance investments, 
economic growth and development.
6
 The Jubilee 2000 Campaign
7
 is another initiative that called 
                                                          
1
 See World Development Reports [1998/1999; 2000/2001; 2004] 
2
 Tax effort is typically defined as the ratio of actual tax collection to potential tax collections, the latter defined 
econometrically by taking into account other countries’ experiences raising tax revenues and controlling for tax 
bases and other determinants of overall tax collections. Countries with low tax to GDP ratios typically suffer from 
low tax effort but the two terms clearly are not always perfectly interchangeable. See, for example, Cyan et al. 2013. 
In this paper we will refer loosely to low tax effort as a low, or lower than expected, tax to GDP ratio.  
3
 See Teera and Hudson (2004); Alm, Martinez-Vazquez and Schneider (2004); Bird, Martinez-Vazquez and 
Torgler (2004; 2008)  
4
 See Neumayer (2002);  Ndikumana (2004); Freytag and Pehnelt (2009) 
5
 See www.worldbank/org/ 
6
 Initiatives such as the Classic initiatives, Toronto terms Initiative and the  Paris Club Initiative were implemented 
to assist with debt burden of these countries  
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for the cancellation of “third world” debt. This initiative was more extensive than the HIPC 
initiative in that the amount earmarked for debt forgiveness ranged between $200 and $300 
billion and it covered 52 countries (compared with 41 under HIPC). However, with the 
realization that countries still had huge debt stocks, a 100 percent forgiveness of loans to HIPC 
graduates was granted at the June 2005 G-8 summit. These more generous forgiveness terms 
sought, as before, to ease the debt burden of developing countries and encourage physical capital 
accumulation which was expected would eventually lead to higher incomes and a greater share 
of national income in government coffers.   
However, the chain of events linking debt forgiveness to higher incomes and finally to 
higher tax revenues is not as straightforward as one may think because there is at least one 
inherent moral hazard problem associated with the provision of debt forgiveness. The primary 
issue is that debt forgiveness has the potential to lower financial discipline because recipient 
governments may act in future years on the expectation that new bailouts will be received. 
Therefore, the act of providing debt forgiveness today can cause countries to come to expect 
more debt forgiveness in the future ultimately leading to a ‘softening’ of their overall budget 
constraint. One possible outcome of a soft budget constraint is that developing countries may not 
have an incentive to bolster their own tax effort and therefore fail to make development a 
sustainable goal.  
In this paper we ask the question of whether the expectation of debt forgiveness actually 
acts to soften developing countries’ budget constraints by investigating in particular how debt 
forgiveness, after controlling for other economic and institutional variables, does actually affect 
tax effort in those countries.  
Tax effort reveals a government preference for taxing its existing tax base.
8
 In general, 
tax effort in developing countries is considerably lower than in developed countries.
9
 Low tax 
effort in turn leads developing countries to face difficulties, sometimes extreme, to keep up with 
their debt service payments and all other budgetary demands.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
7
 Jubilee 2000 campaign was started in the early 1990s in over 40 countries, with the main objective being the 
cancellation of third world debt by the year 2000.   
8
 See Bahl, R. (1971); Teera et al. (2004); Gupta et al (2003; 2013); Alm et al. (2004); Bird et al (2004; 2008),  
Mkandawire (2010); and Cyan et al.(2013).  
9
 The average tax revenues found in many developing countries is around 10-15 percent which is relatively low 
when compared to say OECD countries with tax collections around 40 percent (see, e.g., Kaldor (1963) and Tanzi 
and Zee (2000:303)). Countries such as Niger and Guatemala all have below average tax revenues and are struggling 
to increase this above 11 percent. 
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Beyond investigating the impact of debt forgiveness on tax effort, one must ask whether a 
reverse causation is actually in place; that is, whether countries with lower tax ratios are actually 
more likely to be provided with more debt forgiveness.
10
 Dealing with this potential endogeneity 
problem is important from an empirical estimation viewpoint, but also important from a policy 
viewpoint. Clarifying this issue allows to us to discern whether, on the one hand, the 
international financing community is saying one thing –advising developing countries to become 
more self-reliant on their own domestic tax revenues-- but in reality practicing something very 
different—by de facto discouraging them from doing so. For example, the Paris club creditors 
have been urging developing countries (HIPC) to raise their revenue collections above 15 
percent of GDP to qualify for assistance under the HIPC initiative; however, those countries that 
have lower tax to GDP ratios have been treated preferentially in terms of debt forgiveness and 




One of the underlying reasons given in the literature for the low tax effort observed is the 
lack of political will to tap into existing ‘taxable capacity” with current tax structures and, in 
general, to increase tax collections. Other factors that have been identified include weak 
administrative capacity, high levels of income inequality,  high levels of corruption, lower levels 
of trade openness, a less developed manufacturing sector—traditionally easier to tax—and 
predominance of the agricultural sector—traditionally harder to tax.
12
 However, as was put by 
Kaldor (1963) many decades ago, even the poorest of countries have sufficient ‘capacity’ both in 
economic and administrative terms to tax more than they do.
13
 Therefore, it is important to ask 
what may actually be behind the overall reluctance among those countries to tax themselves. 
 In this paper we focus on one potentially important factor that so far has not been 
adequately researched in the literature; whether the otherwise well-intentioned actions of the 
international financial community involving debt forgiveness has been a cause of the low tax 
effort observed among many developing countries.  Empirically we use panel data for 66 
countries over the period 1989-2008 and control for fixed country effects and year effects.  Our 
                                                          
10
 The criteria used by the international financial community to include a country in the list of those deserving debt 
forgiveness include low levels of revenue generation. Low taxes are also likely to be present in other criteria used 
such as large budget deficits or low levels of spending on infrastructure and social services. 
11
 See www.clubdeparis.org/ 
12
 See, for example Gupta (2003); Alm, Martinez-Vazquez and Schneider (2004); and Bird et al.  (2008). 
13
 See Kaldor (1963) 
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main finding is that debt forgiveness does actually seem to trigger a significant decline in the 
actual tax to GDP ratios, implying that debt forgiveness acts for developing country governments 
as a convenient substitute for otherwise politically costly efforts to increase their own tax 
revenues.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two briefly reviews the related 
literatures on tax effort and debt forgiveness. Section three discusses a simplified conceptual 
framework. The empirical model and a discussion of the data follow in sections four. The 
estimation results are discussed in section five. The conclusions and policy implications are 
presented in section six.  
 
Literature Review 
Tax revenues are essential for providing public goods and services in a sustainable 
manner. For Kaldor (1963) the key indicator of whether a country can transition from a position 
of aid-dependency to one of economic self-sufficiency depends on whether a state learns how to 
tax, thereby halting the vicious cycle of aid reliance. Aid dependency has long been recognized 
for its potential deleterious effects on domestic tax revenue collections (Bauer, 1972; Azam et 
al.,1999).  
For the most part, the potential effects of aid dependency were not studied in the 
traditional tax effort literature (Lotz and Morrs, 1967; Bahl 1971; Chelliah 1971; Chelliah et al. 
al. 1975). More recently a number of studies have investigated the impact of foreign aid on tax 
effort, although none has investigated the impact of debt forgiveness. The evidence obtained thus 
far on the impact of foreign aid is inconclusive. First, there is a group of papers that have found 
evidence of a negative impact of foreign aid on tax collections as a share of GDP.  Ghura (1998) 
examined the effect of the conventional tax effort variables and foreign aid in a panel of 39 sub-
Saharan African countries for the period 1985-1996 and found foreign aid to be significant and 
negatively correlated with the share of taxes to GDP. Feyzioglu, Swaroop and Zhu (1998), using 
a panel of 38 developing countries to study the relationship between foreign aid and public 
spending in recipient countries, found that an increase of $1.00 in foreign aid leads to an increase 
of $0.33 in total government spending with the remainder being used for tax relief. Brautigam 
(2008) categorized African countries according to their aid dependency ratio – the share of aid in 
GDP – and found that 71 percent of these countries had tax effort lower than 10 percent. Also, 
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Remmer (2004) using a panel of middle and lower-income countries for the period 1970-1999 
provides evidence of depressing effects of aid on domestic revenue mobilization.  
There are some studies that find zero-effect of foreign aid. Leuthold (1991) used a panel 
of 8 African countries for the period 1973-1981 and found a negative although statistically 
insignificant effect of aid on tax revenues. Teera and Hudson (2004) used data for 116 developed 
and developing countries for 1975-1998, and also found a zero effect of aid on tax effort. There 
are also a few studies that found a positive significant effect of foreign aid on tax collections, 
including Franco-Rodriguez (2000), and for the case of Kenya, Mavrotas (2002).  
While all the above studies have looked at the impact of overall foreign aid, a few more 
studies have taken the composition of aid into account. Some evidence emerges in this group of 
studies that foreign aid in the form of grants, which do not have to be repaid, tend to have larger 
negative effects on domestic tax revenue mobilization than foreign aid in the form of loans, 
which, of course, are supposed to be repaid.
14
 The distinction between grants and loans is closer 
to our interest on the impact of debt forgiveness since this latter could be also considered as a 
desperate ex-post type of grant. However, the evidence for effects of grant vis-à-vis loans is still 
mixed. In an earlier study, Heller (1975) found for a panel of 11 African countries that both 
grants and loans lead to a reduction in domestic taxes. On the other hand, Otim (2004) and Brun 
et al. (2007) found an overall positive effect of both loans and grants on tax revenue 
mobilization. Other researchers have found differentiated results for loans and grants. Khan and 
Hoshino (1992) found for a sample of five South and Southeast Asian countries over the period 
1955-1976 that grants reduce tax revenue mobilization effort while loans increase it. Gupta et al. 
                                                          
14
 For this general argument see Brautigam, Fjeldstad, and Moore (2008).  Note that some studies have 
focused exclusively on the role of grants. For example, Odedokun (2003) found that grants reduce tax collection 
efforts in 72 developing countries. Other papers have looked at the related question of whether aid “strings” are 
successful at restricting the behavior of government. For example, Cashel-Cordo and Craig (1990) found that the 
type of conditionality in foreign assistance to be important in determining the impact on the public sector budget. In 
the case of low conditionality loans used by the IMF for mainly budget support in developing countries those 
authors found large negative effects on current revenues. In another related literature, Khilji and Zampelli (1994) 
examined the tax revenue effect of U.S military and non-military assistance in the cases of 8 major recipients over 
the period 1972-1987. They found U.S. military assistance and non-military assistance result in domestic tax 
reductions of the recipient countries.  
 
 International Debt Forgiveness 7 
(2003) using a panel of 107 developing countries over the period 1970-2002 also found the 
possible substitutability of tax revenues for grant monies but not so for loans. 
There are finally in the literature several country case studies, which have also found 
mixed results. For example, Gang and Khan (1990) in a time series study on India found that 
both grants and loans generally go into development projects leaving tax revenue mobilization 
unchanged. Pack and Pack (1990) also found that in Indonesia foreign aid stimulated a more than 
approximate change in expenditures and did not lead to a reduction in domestic revenue-raising.  
In summary, even though the impact of foreign aid on tax effort was not considered in the 
earlier conventional literature on tax effort, a large number of more recent studies have analyzed 
those effects. Overall, the evidence is mixed. Some studies have found foreign aid to affect 
negatively tax mobilization effort, while other studies have found no significant effects and yet 
others have found a positive stimulating effect on tax effort. Some of the differences in empirical 
findings can be attributed to the different country samples and time periods used and also to the 
different methodologies. But clearly, the impact of foreign aid on tax effort realized by 
developing countries is far from settled. From the perspective of this paper, it is important that 
none of the previous studies have examined the potential impact of debt forgiveness on the tax 
mobilization effort of developing countries, which is the main theme of this paper. If different 
forms of foreign aid may have a negative impact on the tax revenue effort of recipient countries 
we would expect this to be more strongly evident in the case of debt forgiveness given that there 
are less strings attached ex-post, that it is bulky and more noticeable to policymakers, and that it 
is likely to generate expectations of further debt forgiveness down the road.    
In an attempt to answer our second question of whether a reverse causation is actually in 
place, that is, whether countries with lower tax ratios are actually more likely to be provided with 
more debt forgiveness, we begin by looking at who gets selected for debt forgiveness. A striking 
feature of debt relief is that it is highly persistent over time, with many countries benefiting from 
repeated rounds of debt forgiveness whereas other countries never receive it. Freytag and Pehnelt 
(2009), for example, found that countries that received debt forgiveness in the past were more 
likely to receive it again. This is suggestive of path dependence for debt forgiveness. In our 
sample of 66 developing countries, 25 never received debt forgiveness over the period 1989-
2008, whereas another 41 countries have receive six or more rounds of debt forgiveness during 
the same 20-year period. 
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The existing literature of debt relief/forgiveness shows that the impact of governance on 
debt relief is mixed. Alesina and Weder (2002) document that less corrupt countries are not more 
likely to get either aid or debt relief. Chauvin and Kraay (2007) on the other hand, found that 
countries with better policies are more likely to receive aid and also that large debtors vis-a vis 
multilateral creditors are more likely to receive debt relief in a sample of low-income countries 
only. Also, Neumayer (2002) found that some measures of governance are associated with debt 
relief but others are not.  
The evidence that debt relief goes to smaller, or poorer, countries is mixed. Neumayer 
(2002) found that a country’s per capita GDP and its external debt share of GDP are crucial 
determinants of debt relief. These indicators of need suggest that the greater the need the more 
debt forgiveness will be provided. However, Freytag and Pehnelt (2009) found that the actual 
debt burden of many of these poorer countries was not crucial in determining whether or not they 
receive debt forgiveness.  
Conceptual Framework  
Creating a soft budget constraint  
The origins and consequences of the international practice of debt forgiveness may be best 
understood within the model of the Soft Budget Constraint (SBC) (Kornai 1980; 2003),  which 
develops the expectation of a bailout by an entity (in this context, an aid-receiving country 
government), in the event of financial distress.
15
 In the context of this paper, the SBC is caused 
by a lack of commitment on the part of the international financial community to not bailout 
“profligate” poor country governments ex post, creating the expectation that additional bailouts 
will come in the future. The debt forgiveness or bailout itself –which can be interpreted  as an ad 
hoc ‘additional funding’ provided to poor country governments when they would otherwise be 
unable to service their obligations – does not constitute the SBC, but rather it is the expectation 
of bailouts in the future that do (Rodden,2003). 
Bailouts as a sequential game 
The formation of bailout expectations can be analyzed as a sequential game played 
between the international financial community and an aid receiving government. In this 
                                                          
15
 Several other authors have further investigated the potential causes of the SBC, for example, Wildasin (1999) and 
Li et al. (1998); and Qian et al. (1998).  
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framework, it is assumed that the aid receiving government does not have complete information 
about the payoffs accruing to the international financial community or donor country. The 
international financing community may be one of two types – committed or not - to never allow 
bailouts and the aid receiving governments must make an assessment about the probability that 
the lender/donor is the committed type. 
In the first stage of the game the international financial community must decide whether 
or not to provide loans. In addition, at this stage of the game it is assumed that the international 
financial community will also make an announcement that it is its policy to never allow bailouts. 
Officials in the aid receiving government will try to assess the credibility of this commitment, 
making its move at the second stage of the game in light of these assessments. At this stage, 
those government officials can either spend and borrow within their means, or over-borrow and 
attempt to shift the costs onto others. If officials in the aid receiving government borrow within 
reasonable limits to finance its necessities, then the game ends. However, if the officials engage 
in over-borrowing they may expect that the international financing community will eventually 
take over its obligation through providing bailouts. The donor country then makes the third 
move, and it must decide either to provide a bailout or refuse it. If the costs to the international 
financing community of not providing additional funds/bailouts exceed those of providing them, 
the donor reveals itself to be non-committed. If the government officials in the borrowing 
country have strong beliefs that the international financing community is not committed at the 
first stage of the game to a no-bailout policy, it has incentives to raise too little tax revenue. One 
consequence of raising too little taxes is that debt servicing costs will eventually become 
burdensome as the recipient country will find it increasingly difficult to keep up with servicing 
charges. The eventual built up of unpaid debt servicing charges will mean that the recipient 
country will require a bailout to keep afloat. Once a bailout is provided, government officials of 
the recipient country will form the expectation that additional bailouts will be provided again in 
the future. In contrast, if the government officials of the recipient country believe that the donor 
will be committed to a no-bailout policy when making its fiscal decisions at the first stage, the 
recipient country will spend within its means by raising domestic taxes.
16
 
                                                          
16
 The lack of credible commitment may have different causes such as, donors being  viewed as having implicitly 
guaranteed the liabilities of the borrowing country (Bai and Wang, 1999) or recipients being seen as “too large to 
fail” (Wildasin, 1999). But whatever its causes, current bailouts can lead recipient countries to form expectations 
about future bailouts possibilities. 
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Theoretical predictions 
The existence of expectations for a future bailout can be signaled by the accumulated 
share of debt forgiveness relative to GDP in the past. The simple conceptual framework of 
“bailouts as a sequential game” above is sufficient to yield a priori expectation for the sign of 
this variable signaling the presence of a soft budget constraint in an empirical model trying to 
explain the level of tax collection effort of a recipient country. The accumulated stock of past 
debt forgiveness is likely to create a memory in the minds of recipient country officials to the 
extent that they come to expect that their debts will be forgiven today and in the future. Hence, 
the higher the accumulated share of debt forgiveness relative to GDP can negatively affect tax 
revenue collections.  
Empirical Strategy  
Our ultimate goal is to test the role of debt forgiveness on the tax mobilization effort of 
developing countries. Because actual performance in mobilizing revenues can be one of the 
criteria used by donors to select what countries enter a particular round of debt forgiveness, we 
need to allow for this potential endogeneity in our estimation approach. In order to do so, a two-
equation model is used, with debt forgiveness and tax revenue share being the endogenous 
variables. To consistently estimate these equations, we will apply two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
technique. The specification of the system will make clear what variables are available as 
instruments. We turn now to a discussion of the explanatory variables in our tax effort model, 
our first equation in the system of equations:  

















  1    This equation explaining tax mobilization effort is a standard linear specification, with the 
addition of the debt forgiveness variable. In order to properly estimate this model, we need to 
account for the role of other determinants of the tax collections to GDP ratio. This will ensure 
that any inferences about the relationship between debt forgiveness and tax effort are robust.  
The more recent empirical literature on the determinants of the tax to GDP ratio (Bird et al. 
2008; Cyan et al. 2013; Mkandawire, 2010; Clist et al. 2011; Gupta et al. 2014) provides 
guidance concerning those factors, and we follow this literature. Our strategy is to augment the 
baseline specification to include the variable signaling the presence of a soft budget constraint, 
namely, accumulated debt forgiveness as a share of GDP.  
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In this model, i  indexes the countries in the sample and t  the time period; TE denotes the 
country’s level of tax revenue mobilization effort measured as tax revenues as a share of gross 
domestic product (GDP); DEBTFOR   is the accumulated debt forgiveness share of GDP; POP
 
is 
the rate of population growth, XM is the degree of openness of the economy measured as the 
share of exports plus imports in gross domestic product (GDP); NONAGRIC   represents the 
non-agricultural sector value added as a share of GDP; LOANS  and GRANTS  are the two 
components of official development assistance (ODA) received by the country in year t ; INF  is 
the inflation rate ; and GOV is a measure of governance. i and t represents  country fixed 
effects and time fixed effects respectively. 
it denotes the idiosyncratic error term.  
Now, besides our key explanatory variables, the other explanatory variables employed in 
the basic model follow the best practice in the conventional tax effort literature. Demographic 
characteristics may play a role. In particular, the rate of population growth may impact tax effort 
negatively if the population grows at a rate faster than the tax system is able to accommodate this 
change, failing to capture new taxpayers. A frequently used control variable is the availability of 
‘tax handles’ in a country typically measured by the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP or the 
degree of openness of an economy. It is expected to positively influence the level of tax effort 
because trade-related taxes are easier to collect, relative to say income taxes or other domestic 
taxes since the goods involved enter or leave the country at specified locations. In a related 
manner, the sectoral composition of national income may also affect the ability to collect taxes. 
In particular, the larger the relative importance of the agriculture sector in GDP, the lower the 
need to spend on governmental activities and services, since many public sector activities and 
services are city-based (Tanzi, 1992). Also it is often the case that governments decide for 
political reasons to exempt from taxes a large share of agricultural activities (Bird et al. 2008).  
Agriculture is also well-known to be a hard-to-tax sector. Therefore, a higher share of agriculture 
in GDP is expected to lead to lower tax ratios. The rate of inflation may also play a role in 
determining tax revenues collections. It is hypothesize that higher inflation rates, possibly 
associated with the generation of seigniorage and unindexed tax systems will likely produce 
increases in tax revenues (Gupta, 2014).  
Foreign aid - consisting of loans and grants – can also impact the level of tax effort in an 
economy. It has been argued in the international aid literature that grants are free resources that 
substitute for domestic revenues, while the burden of future loan repayments induces 
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policymakers to mobilize taxes or, at least, to protect current levels of revenue protection 
(Brautigam, 2008). Therefore, we would expect grants relative to GDP to have a negative effect 
on the tax ratio while loans should have a positive or no effect. Further, we include the squared 
terms for both loans and grants to try to account for any non-linearity that may exist in the 
relationship between them and tax revenues. Finally, the types and quality of institutions in a 
country can also impact the amount of tax revenues collected. It is argued that institutional 
quality can either magnify or mitigate tax revenues. Countries with weak institutions for 
example, may undermine the ability of the authorities to collect taxes (Bird et al. (2008), and 
Cyan et al. 2013). 
We will now turn our attention to our second question of whether or not a reverse 
causation is actually in place. The variables included in the debt forgiveness model will be 
informed by that literature, with the tax revenues variable being an addition to this model. The 
debt forgiveness equation is estimated in the form:   














        2          
In this model, i  indexes the countries in the sample and t  the time period. DEBTFOR  is 
our debt forgiveness construct measured as the accumulated debt forgiveness share of GDP;  TE
is as defined above.  In addition to the share of external debt to GDP, EXTDEBT which captures 
the need of a country for debt forgiveness, the debt service to export ratio, DEBTSER  is also 
included in this specification to help capture the needs of a country for debt forgiveness. One 
other variable that is suggestive of the needs of a country is the log of per capita GDP denoted by 
Y  (measured in logs of constant US dollars). The political-strategic variable used is arms import 
to total imports denoted by ARMS . The rationale behind this variable is that donor countries may 
be more accommodative to provide debt relief to developing countries if there are some military 
strategic issues involved, and this may be captured by the relative importance of arms imports. 
AID  is measured as Official Development Assistance and the argument for its inclusion is that 
higher levels of aid will be associated with higher debts. This higher level of debt sometimes 
become unsustainable and therefore requires debt forgiveness if these countries are to have any 
reasonable chance at growth and development. GOV is our measure of governance. It is argued 
that the better the quality of governance in a country the more likely it would be for that country 
to receive at least one round of debt forgiveness (Neumayer, 2002; Chauvin and Kraay, 2007; 
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and Freytag and Pehnelt, 2009). i is country-specific fixed effects and it denotes the 
idiosyncratic error term.  
Equations (1) and (2) together comprise the model linking tax effort and debt forgiveness. 
Tax effort is a function of debt forgiveness, among other things, and debt forgiveness is a 
function of several variables, including tax revenues. Thus tax revenues share and debt 
forgiveness are treated as endogenous variables whose values are determined jointly in a two-
equation system comprising equations (1) and (2). The order conditions for identifiability 
indicate that both equations are over-identified. Neither of these equations could be consistently 
estimated via OLS, since the debt forgiveness variable in each equation is correlated with the 
respective error term.   
Data 
A panel dataset covering 66 developing countries for the period 1989-2008 is used in the 
estimation. The starting year for our sample is determined by the availability of data for our 
variable of interest, debt forgiveness. Table 1 presents the summary statistics of all the variables 
used in the regressions. Our main explanatory variable of interest is the accumulated stock of 
debt forgiven as a percentage of constant prices GDP, which we consider as most relevant 
toward the formation of bailout expectations. Debt forgiveness, as defined in the Global 
Development Finance (GDF) Manual of 2008 is the amount of the debt stock, principal, and/or 
interest that was not paid or forgiven from the beginning of the observation period to the 
particular year being observed.
17
 This figure does not include the amounts for either debt 
buybacks or debt swaps since those operations do not reflect a reduction/change in the debt 
stock.  
  
                                                          
17
 It is quite likely that bailout expectations will be also affected by the amount of forgiven debt prior to the 
beginning of the observation period in our sample. However, we do not have reliable data on debt forgiveness prior 
to 1989. 
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Table 1: Summary of the Variables 
Variables     Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      Tax Revenue/GDP  431 0.1523 0.0669 0.0122 0.4279 
Accumulated Debt Forgiven /GDP 431 0.0497 0.1029 0 0.6216 
Per Capita GDP 431 2191.6370 1775.9240 81.0090 8212.9010 
Population Growth 431 1.6718 0.9836 -3.9306 3.8396 
Loans/ GDP 431 0.0247 0.0382 0.0003 0.2733 
      Grants/ GDP 431 0.0099 0.0245 0.0000 0.1623 
Non-agricultural/ GDP 431 0.8465 0.0964 0.4026 0.9920 
(Imports + Exports)/GDP 431 0.3903 0.2635 0.0334 1.3577 
Governance 431 3.3643 6.4864 1 14 
Arms Imports/Total Imports) 413 0.0101 0.0235 0 0.1982 
      External Debt/Exports 415 19.2568 12.0415 0.7947 79.4491 
Debt Service/Total Exports 431 2.6517 2.7310 0.3442 24.7372 
 
 We measure the dependent variable – Tax Effort – as the share of tax revenues in Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). Data for this variable come from the World Development Indicators 
(WDI) for 2009.  The data on loans and grants are taken from the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development’s database (OECD.Stat). The data for the other control variables 
including GDP per capita, population growth, exports, imports, the share of agriculture in GDP, 
the share of manufacture in GDP and the share of services in GDP come from the WDI database. 
The data for the governance variables are taken from the Freedom House (2008) and the Polity 
IV (2009) databases. The Freedom House database reports scores on both political rights and 
civil liberties. These scores range on a scale from one-to-seven, with one representing the highest 
degree of freedom and seven the lowest. However, to facilitate easy interpretation of the 
coefficients on these variables we added the reported scores for both political rights and civil 
liberties and then subtract the sum from 14. This means that higher values represent improved 
freedom.
18
  The Polity IV database reports a composite measure of governance based on if a 
country is democratic or autocratic. This score ranges from -10 to +10 with +10 representing a 
strong democracy.  
 
                                                          
18
 See Bird, Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler (2004; 2008) and Ndikumana (2004). 
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Results 
Table 2 contains the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) results from the conventional tax 
effort model. Our variable of interest, accumulated debt forgiveness is in line with predictions 
that the higher the accumulated debt forgiven, as a share of GDP, the lower will be a country’s 
tax effort. As accumulated debt forgiven by one percentage point, tax revenues decline by 0.05 
percentage point. This result is indicative of the level of substitutability between aid monies, or 
more precisely forgiven debts and tax effort in our group of developing countries. Further, this 
result may also suggest that government officials are using aid monies to relieve the taxable 
population of some of its burden to possibly lengthen their own political careers. The coefficient 
for openness, as measured by the share of imports to GDP has the predicted sign and this result is 
in line with previous studies.             
However, there is an obvious problem with using OLS, since our variable of interest 
could be endogenous. For example, an expectation of a bailout could potentially induce 
policymakers to not improve their tax machinery to increase tax collections, but also, the poor 
tax performance observed among these countries could be the motivating factor behind the 
bailout opportunities they received. Our empirical models therefore allows for the endogeneity of 
both tax revenues and debt forgiveness. The 2SLS results for our first question are reported in 
Table 3. The coefficient of accumulated debt forgiveness remains statistically significant. The 
choice of a unique instrument is not addressed anywhere in the literature. However, studies by 
Neumayer (2002); Ndikumana (2004); Freytag and Pehnelt (2009); and Presbitero (2009) 
suggest factors such as arms imports, total population, governance/institutions, per capita GDP, 
ODA aid and external debt share of GDP among others, as some of the determinants of debt 
forgiveness. The first stage results, in table 3, show that the instruments perform well. The F-
statistics for first stage regression model is statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that 
the instruments are sufficiently identified. This conclusion is reinforced by a Kleibergen and 
Paap Lagrange multiplier test also suggesting that the instruments are identified (Kleibergen and 
Paap, 2006).  Additionally, the Hansen J- tests of over-identifying restrictions do not reject the 
null of a well-identified model. We conclude that the instruments seem reasonably well suited 
for this purpose.  
The results from Table 3 show that the coefficient for accumulated debt forgiveness is 
negative, economically meaningful, and statistically significant. Controlling for the endogeneity 
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of this variable also produced an estimate that is larger in magnitude than the OLS coefficient 
estimate.  Most of the control variables in Table 3 are of the expected sign, though not all are 
statistically significant. One exception is that we find a reduction in inflation rates to be 
associated with increases in tax revenues. We hypothesize that higher inflation rates, possibly 
associated with the generation of seigniorage – a likely problem in developing countries--, and 
would increase tax revenues collection. While this effect is counter to our expectation, it is only 
weakly statistically significant and economically meaningless. Given our findings, the results 
show that prolonged debt forgiveness is likely to create a disincentive to poor countries seeking 
to improve their tax effort.  
In summary, our proxy for the soft budget constraint do seem to have a robust impact on 
the tax ratios for the countries in our sample once we take into account other factors such as 
openness, governance, inflation, loans, grants and population growth. This result gives credence 
to the hypothesis that the amount of tax collected depends on the intensity of bailouts.   
Table 4 presents the results for our second question – whether or not there is a reverse 
causality in place. That is, is the international financing community unintentionally creating the 
problem of low tax revenues by providing more debt forgiveness to these countries? Again, the 
F-statistics for the first stage regression model is statistically significant at the 1% level, 
indicating that the instruments are sufficiently identified. This conclusion is again reinforced by 
the Kleibergen and Paap Lagrange multiplier test which suggests that the instruments are 
identified (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006).  Additionally, the Hansen J- tests of over-identifying 
restrictions do not reject the null of a well-identified model. We conclude that the instruments 
seem reasonably well suited for this purpose. 
The results from Table 4 show that the coefficient for tax revenues is negative, 
economically meaningful, and statistically significant. The tax revenues for our sample of 
developing countries fall by approximately 1.4 percentage points for every one percentage point 
increase in debt forgiveness received. This finding provides support to the hypothesis that the 
international financing community, with its well-intentioned action to lessen the debt burden of 
these countries could actually be perpetuating a cycle of poverty. Overall, the other controls 
perform well. The results indicate that the greater the level of development of a country, as 
measured by its per capita GDP, the less will be its need for debt forgiveness. This hypothesis is 
supported by the negative and strongly significant coefficient on per capita GDP in our results. 
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Theoretically, good governance or improvement in governance quality can positively influence 
the amount of debt forgiveness a country receives (Freytag and Penhelt, 2009). Our result 
supports this proposition.  
      
Table 2: Determinants of Tax Effort (OLS Estimation) 
 OLS 
  
Accumulated Debt Forgiveness (as a share of GDP) -0.0464** 
 (0.0206) 
Per Capita GDP 0.0141 
 (0.0113) 
Population Growth 0.0024 
 (0.0028) 
Loans (as a share of GDP) 0.0054 
 (0.0881) 
Grants (as a share of GDP) -0.1590 
 (0.1520) 










                              Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses. Country-specific fixed effects 
                              are included in this specification. 
  
18 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
                          Table 3: Determinants of Tax Effort (as a share of GDP)  
                                                       First Stage                            
                                2SLS               Regression 
  




Population growtht -0.000777 
 (0.00293) 


















Arms Importst-1                                                        0.1662** 
                                                   (0.0717) 
GDP Per Capitat-1 (log)                                                       -0.1421*** 
                                                         (0.0457) 
Governancet-1                                                          0.0039** 
                                                      (0.0017) 
External Debt to Exportst-1                                                        0.0003 
                                                        (0.0003) 
Population Totalt-1(log)                                                          0.3372* 
                                                         (0.1776) 
External Debt to GDPt-1                                                         -0.1192 
                                                         (0.0389) 
First Stage Diagnostics 
F-Stat 
                                   
                                                             4.71*** 
Under ID, P-value    0.0042 






Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Under ID refers to the   null 
hypothesis that the model is under identified (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006). Country fixed effects are included in 
both stages. Time fixed effects are included in the 2SLS regression.  
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     Table 4: Determinants of Accumulated Debt Forgiveness (as a share of GDP)  
                                                       First Stage                            
                                2SLS               Regression 
  
Tax Revenuet-1 -1.391*** 
 (0.447) 
Per Capita GDPt-1 -0.131*** 
 (0.0384) 
Arms Importt-1 0.112 
 (0.0979) 
Debt Servicet-1 -0.0046 
 (0.0073) 












GDP Per Capitat(log)   
                                                    0.0641***                             
                                                      (0.0203)                              
                                                    -0.0122                           
                                                      (0.0724)                              
                                                       0.0470* 
                                                      (0.0284) 
Inflationt                                                     -0.00001*** 
                                                      (0.000003) 
Population Growtht                                                          -0.0009 
                                                      (0.0038) 
ODA_Loanst                                                        0.0093 
                                                        (0.0839) 
ODA_Grantst                                                          -0.2698** 
                                                         (0.1339) 
Governancet 
 
External Debtt  
                                                         -0.0002 
                                                          (0.0013)                              
                                                     0.0513***                           
                                                           (0.0115) 
  
First Stage Diagnostics 
F-Stat 
                                   
                                                             2.69*** 
Under ID, P-value    0.0194 






     Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses. Under ID refers to the   null   
     hypothesis that the model is under identified (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006). Country fixed effects are included in both    
     stages.  
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Conclusion  
 
The main conclusion of this paper is that the international financial community may be 
doing some serious harm by relieving developing countries of their loan repayment obligations. 
The results show that debt forgiveness is likely to create a disincentive to poor countries seeking 
to improve their tax effort. Our results also show that as countries reduce their tax intake they are 
given more and more debt forgiveness to make up for the shortfall in tax revenues. Therefore one 
can safely conclude that while the international financing community is encouraging these 
countries to increase their tax intake, they simultaneously create the problem of low tax revenues 
by providing more debt forgiveness to these countries. These results may be comforting to the 
detractors of this mode of assistance—debt forgiveness-- provided to developing countries who 
often argue that it might lead them to engage in over-borrowing with the expectation that their 
creditors will forgive them time and again. Thus perpetuating a cycle of aid dependence, which 
in and of itself can lead to chronic macroeconomic imbalances due to the volatility of this mode 
of financing. Also, some would argue that debt forgiveness initiatives are an insufficient remedy 
to the economic problems facing poor countries and these results in some ways confirm their 
conjecture.  The evidence shows a consistently lower level of tax revenue collection across the 
different specification which will ultimately mean lowered or sub-standard public service 
provision and lower growth possibilities. 
These results have particular strong policy implications for both developed countries and 
developing countries. In the case of developed donor countries, they could include restrictive 
covenants in debt forgiveness contracts that compel developing countries to sustain or even to 
increase their current tax collections effort. In addition, the international financial community 
could tie access to debt forgiveness monies to the creditworthiness of developing countries. If 
developing countries continue to use debt forgiveness monies as a substitute for raising their own 
tax revenues, then the pool of funds available for debt forgiveness will eventually dry-up. So if it 
is tied to some measure of creditworthiness then that could induce developing countries to raise 
their tax efforts. Failure on the part of developing countries to increase tax efforts could result in 
them losing access to future loans.  
The most important contribution of this paper has been to extend the conventional model 
of tax effort, showing that debt forgiveness can significantly impede the development of 
sustainable fiscal systems in the developing world, and that the damage is increased with the 
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extent of debt forgiveness. Of course, in order to fully understand the tax performance of any one 
country one needs to pay close attention to the fact that debt forgiveness decisions are made on a 
case-by-case basis and are tailored to each debtor country’s individual situation. However, the 
estimated average effects found in this paper should bring significant caution with the 
implementation of this type of policy by the international community. 
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